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Abstract
Medicare Part B pays physicians through a fixed fee schedule designed loosely as a
system of average-cost reimbursement. This paper examines four difficulties faced
by systems of this kind. First, Medicare’s payment model would be improved if it
accounted for the medical value and cost-effectiveness of treatments in addition to
their input costs. Second, uniformly applied fee schedules are inefficient when physi-
cians vary in their approaches to medical practice. Allowing Medicare to account for
regional differences in practice styles, which are substantial, may have significant ben-
efits. Third, differences in physicians’ billing practices have similar, largely unstudied,
implications. Proficient billers receive relatively high payments for incremental service
provision, resulting in unintended variation in effective wages. Fourth, differences in
services’ cost structures point to an additional weakness in Medicare Part B’s payment
model. Average-cost reimbursement implies larger profit margins for capital-intensive
services than for labor-intensive services. As implemented, Medicare’s fee schedule
has encouraged significant expansions in the adoption, utilization, and development of
capital-intensive tests and treatments.
∗Clemens: jeffclemens@ucsd.edu
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Most insurers compensate physicians through fee schedules. Determining these fees can
be difficult, as insurers and physicians determine payments for thousands of distinct billing
codes. The history of Medicare’s Resource Based Relative Value Scale (RBRVS), the basis for
its outpatient fee schedule, illustrates the point. Its development and initial implementation
spanned roughly a decade (Newhouse 2002). Private insurers’ adoption of RBRVS-based
models points to both the cost of developing payment systems from scratch and the value of
getting Medicare’s right.1
This paper analyzes four complications that arise in the context of Medicare’s fee sched-
ule. First, Medicare’s payment model suffers from its exclusive focus on cost; it accounts
for neither the health benefits nor the cost-effectiveness of care. Second, physicians vary
in the norms by which they approach the practice of medicine (Cutler, Skinner, Stern and
Wennberg 2013). Third, health care providers vary in their billing practices. This includes
both their coding of patient conditions and the thoroughness with which they request pay-
ment for billable services (Dafny 2005). Finally, services differ significantly in their cost
structures. Fee schedules that reimburse on an average-cost basis have very different impli-
cations for the profit margins associated with capital- and labor-intensive services.
I examine these complications through the lens of the classic Ellis and McGuire (1986)
model of physician payment. Physician payment systems face a fundamental tradeoff. Paying
on a per-unit, or fee-for-service, basis risks encouraging excess service provision; paying on a
salary basis risks rewarding those who skimp on the quality and quantity of care. Ellis and
McGuire characterize the optimal strength of per-unit incentives in light of these competing
concerns. That is, they derive the mix of salary and per-unit payment that leads physicians
to provide care to the point at which marginal benefits equal marginal costs. This optimal
mix depends crucially on the weight physicians place on patient health, relative to income,
1See Nandedkar (2011), Gesme and Wiseman (2010), and Fontes (2013) for practitioner characterizations
of payment models and the process by which physicians negotiate with insurers.
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when deciding how much care to provide.
As previously recognized, no single combination of salary and per-unit payment is op-
timal when physicians vary in their concern for patient health (Allard, Jelovac and Leger
2011, Godager 2013). I show that this conclusion applies to their billing norms as well. Both
considerations imply that there may be value in increasing the flexibility with which Medi-
care’s fee schedule is implemented. Specifically, there may be gains from allowing claims
administrators (Medicare’s regional “carriers”) to account for regional differences in physi-
cians’ practice and billing norms. The costs associated with variation in billing and practice
norms also have implications for physician training. Outcomes could be improved by training
physicians more uniformly in these particular respects.
At the national level, adjusting payments for differences in the cost structures of capital-
and labor-intensive services may also have significant value. Average-cost reimbursement
implies larger profit margins for capital-intensive services than for labor-intensive services.
This appears to have been exacerbated by Medicare’s initial estimates of capacity utilization
for advanced imaging equipment, including MRI machines (Lowes 2013). Understating uti-
lization led Medicare’s average-cost approach to overpay on a per-service basis. A growing
body of research, discussed below, finds that the resulting incentives encouraged signifi-
cant expansions in the adoption, utilization, and development of capital-intensive tests and
treatments.2
The paper proceeds as follows. Section I develops a simplified version of Ellis and
McGuire’s payment model. Section II emphasizes the relevance of physicians’ ethics with
respect to the value they place on patient health. Section III assesses the importance of
billing practices, which determine how physicians convert quantities of care provision into
2See, for example, Acemoglu and Finkelstein (2008) and Clemens and Gottlieb (2013) for evidence on
technology adoption. See Mitchell (2007), Mitchell (2008), and Baker (2010) for evidence on utilization.
Clemens (2012) finds evidence on Medicare’s early effects on innovation in medical equipment and devices.
Finkelstein (2004), Acemoglu and Linn (2004), and Budish, Roin and Williams (2013) find evidence that
incentives significantly shape innovation in additional health care settings of interest.
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reimburseable claims. Section IV explores the relevance of variation in the cost-structure of
different services.
1 The Ellis and McGuire Model of Physician Payment
This section develops a simplified version of Ellis and McGuire’s model of physician
payment. Ellis and McGuire answer the following question: what payment method will
lead physicians to supply the socially desired quantity of care, namely the quantity such
that care’s marginal cost equals its marginal benefit? Payments include a fixed, salary-like
component, α, and a reimbursement per unit of care, r. A physician providing q units of
care thus has revenue of Revenue = α + r × q. Letting the function c(q) describe the total
cost of providing q units of care, net profit is pi = α + r × q − c(q).
A key parameter describing physician behavior is the extent to which physicians value
patient health relative to net income. If θ, bounded between 0 and 1, describes the weight
placed on net income and 1 − θ describes the weight placed on patient health, then the
physician’s utility function is
U = θ[α + r × q − c(q)] + (1− θ)b(q). (1)
The b(q) term describes the net benefit patients obtain from receiving q units of care. When
providing an incremental unit of care, physicians thus generate additional revenue of r, incur
marginal costs of MC(q) = c′, and take some pleasure in their patients’ realization of the
marginal benefits of care, MB(q) = b′. The physician’s marginal utility from providing an
additional unit of care is thus
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MU(q) =
dU
dq
= θ[r −MC(q)] + (1− θ)MB(q). (2)
The physician maximizes his or her utility by choosing q such that
θr + (1− θ)MB(q) = θMC(q). (3)
If marginal benefits are strictly decreasing and marginal costs are strictly increasing, the
solution to (3) will be unique.
The manager of the insurance arrangement seeks to maximize the net value of the care
provided to its beneficiaries. Knowing that physicians behave in the manner described
above, the insurer arranges the physicians’ incentives to induce them to provide care until
its marginal benefit equals its marginal cost. The optimal per-unit payment can thus be
found by substituting MC(q∗) = MB(q∗) into equation (3). The algebra below yields an
expression for the optimal payment, r∗:
θr∗ = θMB(q∗)− (1− θ)MB(q∗)
= θMB(q∗)−MB(q∗) + θMB(q∗)
= 2θMB(q∗)−MB(q∗)
= MB(q∗)[2θ − 1]
⇒ r∗ = MB(q)[2θ − 1]
θ
= MB(q∗)[2− 1
θ
]. (4)
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The above expression for the optimal reimbursement rate has two implications. Intu-
itively, optimal reimbursement rates are high when the benefits from care are large. All else
equal, reimbursements should be set to encourage the provision of large quantities of services
that provide substantial health benefits. Notably, Medicare is legislatively bound to base
payments on input costs. Consequently, it takes neither health benefits nor cost-effectiveness
estimates into account.
Second, the optimal reimbursement rate is increasing in the weight physicians place on
net income, and thus decreasing in the weight they place on patient benefits. This can be seen
from the fact that θ appears in the denominator of a term that enters negatively on the right-
hand side; as θ rises, 1
θ
declines and −1
θ
rises. When physicians take pleasure in improving
patient health, optimal payment schemes lean more heavily towards fixed salary payments.
For low θ physicians, augmenting the agency benefit with strong financial incentives induces
inefficiently large quantities of care.
2 Implications of Physician Agency
This section emphasizes two implications of variation in the value physicians place on
patient health. As widely recognized but often left unsaid, the Ellis and McGuire framework
shows that a single payment scheme can only result in optimal care provision when all
physicians place the same weight on patient benefits. When the strength of physician agency
varies, a given payment scheme will either lead some physicians to supply too much care or
others to provide too little. When payments are tailored towards physicians who place low
weight on patient benefits, for example, excess care will tend to be provided by those who
highly value patient health. The former physicians require significant financial incentives to
provide beneficial care while the latter require relatively small per-unit payments.
When payments are fixed through a national fee schedule, as in Medicare Part B, variation
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in physician agency implies inefficiencies in care provision. This conclusion has two related
implications. First, a large body of research describes substantial differences in the practice
of medicine across regions of the United States (Wennberg, Fisher, Skinner et al. 2002).3
Adjusted for regional price differences and demographics, per-beneficiary Medicare spending
ranges from $5,000 in Honolulu to $15,000 in Miami (Gottlieb, Zhou, Song, Andrews, Skinner
and Sutherland 2010). Cutler et al. (2013) provide evidence that these variations are driven
by differences in the way physicians approach medicine rather than differences in health
care demand. Consequently, there may be significant value in allowing Medicare’s regional
carriers, with which it contracts for the administration of Part B claims, to modify payments
in response to regional practice styles.
Second, within a market or payment region, identifying the styles of individual practices
and basing payments upon them would be difficult if not impossible (Allard et al. 2011).
Some degree of inefficiency is thus inevitable when physicians vary in the value they place
on patient health. By extension, the cost of resulting inefficiencies will be particularly large
when the variation in practice styles is great. It is of interest, then, to consider this variation’s
origins.
Researchers typically take the distribution of physician types as given. Physician concern
for patient health distinguishes them from suppliers in most markets, however, making it
worth inquiring as to how these preferences are formed. While this sense of duty may in part
be intrinsic to the individual, it also reflects a core aspect of physician training. Ellis and
McGuire’s model shows that there is value in developing this sense of duty as consistently
as possible.4 Patients and insurance beneficiaries have reason to value both the strength
3Recent work by Abaluck and Agha (2013), for example, investigates variation in physicians’ use of
advanced diagnostic imaging in the context chest CT scans for pulmonary embolism.
4One could demonstrate a proposition along the following lines: Let F (·) be the cumulative distribution
function describing the distribution of θ across a population of physicians. Let G(·) be a mean preserving
spread of F (·). Then for a given population of patients, G(·) will be associated with lower patient welfare
than F (·) when insurers are constrained to select a single per-unit reimbursement rate.
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of physician agency and the uniformity of its application. Evidence on the malleability of
physicians’ practice styles (Molitor 2011) suggests that such efforts may be fruitful.
3 Implications of Physician Billing Practices
The model from Section 1 makes an important assumption about the quantity of care. In
effect, it assumes that fee-for-service payments are based on uniformly verifiable quantities
of care received by patients. Put another way, it assumes uniformity in physicians’ billing
practices; the billed quantity of care and the care delivered to the patient are the same. In
practice, it would be remarkable if this were actually the case.
Variation in the bills submitted for a given level of service provision need not reflect fraud.
Medical billing is non-trivially complicated, and the resulting administrative costs are well
documented (Cutler and Ly 2011). Variation in billing may reflect both differences in the
resources devoted to the process and genuine uncertainty over appropriate billing procedures.
Regarding the latter, Medicare periodically releases extensive guidance characterizing the
appropriate billing of various scenarios (Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services 2013).
The need for such guidance suggests uncertainty, and with it variation in existing billing
practices (Kikano, Goodwin and Stange 2000).5 Even after guidance is issued, appropriate
interpretations may remain open for debate. Additionally, documenting the justification for
all billable procedures can be costly. Physicians may vary in their billing savvy, as well as
in the administrative and managerial resources they choose to devote to the process.
The aggressiveness of physician billing can be modeled as a ratio describing the difference
between the quantity of care received and the quantity billed. As before, let q describe the
quantity of care received. If the parameter a describes the aggressiveness of billing, then
5Kikano et al. (2000) document extensive variation in the billing of Evaluation and Management services.
They find that under-billing is as common as over-billing, suggesting that variation in coding practices should
not be viewed predominantly as a reflection of bad faith behavior.
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the quantity billed can be described as qb = a × q. The utility of a physician with billing
parameter a is thus
U = θ[α + r × a× q − c(q)] + (1− θ)b(q). (5)
Provision of an incremental service gives the physician additional revenue of a × r, has a
marginal cost of MC(q), and provides an agency benefit of (1− θ)MB(q). The physicians’
marginal utility from providing an additional unit of care is thus:
MU(q) =
dU
dq
= θ[a× r −MC(q)] + (1− θ)MB(q). (6)
The physician maximizes his or her utility by choosing the quantity such that
θ × a× r + (1− θ)MB(q) = θMC(q). (7)
The optimal reimbursement rate can be found using the same sequence of steps applied
in Section 1. The optimal reimbursement rate is
r∗ =
MB(q∗)
a
[2− 1
θ
]. (8)
The solution has changed quite little from the solution found in Section 1. The optimal
per-unit payment is simply scaled to account for the rate at which provided services are
converted into billed services.
For any fixed level of the billing parameter, there is a per-unit payment that induces the
efficient quantity of care provision. As in the previous section, problems arise when billing
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savvy varies across physicians. Practices that bill aggressively will, in effect, receive higher
per-unit payments for each service they provide. Consequently, a fixed payment regime will
lead proficient billers to provide excessive quantities of care. Timid billers, who are effectively
underpaid, will provide too little.6 Future research on variation in physician billing practices
would enable a more thorough assessment of the cost of resulting inefficiencies.
4 Implications of the Cost Structures of Capital- and
Labor-Intensive Services
This section discusses difficulties for Medicare’s payment model that arise due to differ-
ences in services’ cost structures. Medicare reimburses physicians on what is intended to
be an average-cost basis. This has significant implications for the profit margins of capital-
intensive services relative to labor-intensive services.
4.1 Low Fixed Costs: The Case of Standard Office Visits
First consider the case of reimbursement for office visits. Basic office visits earn physicians
roughly $50 to $100, depending on the length of the visit and the complexity of the patient’s
condition. In the language of Medicare’s fee schedule, physicians’ “own work,” accounts for
roughly 50 percent of this payment. The remaining 50 percent involves “practice expenses.”
The practice expenses associated with office visits primarily involve staff time and other
variable costs. To a first approximation, one can think of office visits as services for which
essentially all costs are variable costs. This contrasts sharply with the case of MRIs, which
are analyzed below. In the latter case, roughly 80 percent of Medicare’s payment is associated
6As in footnote 4, one could prove a proposition along the following lines: Let F (·) be the cumulative
distribution function describing the distribution of a across a population of physicians. Let G(·) be a mean
preserving spread of F (·). Then for a given population of patients, G(·) will be associated with lower patient
welfare than F (·) when insurers are constrained to select a single per-unit reimbursement rate.
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with the MRI machine itself, which involves a fixed-cost investment.
What are the implications of low fixed costs in systems of average-cost reimbursement?
If marginal costs are constant, then the absence of fixed costs implies constant average cost.
The reimbursement will thus equal the constant marginal and average cost. Costs associated
with a physicians’ own time and with management of the practice are not literally constant.
It is standard to assume that they are increasing, in particular as the practice pushes the
time boundaries of the standard work week. Marginal costs will exceed the average-cost
reimbursement once these sources of rising marginal costs kick in. As implied by equation
(3), this will lead physicians to supply office visits to a point where the marginal benefit of
care (net of patient cost-sharing and inconvenience) remains moderately positive.
4.2 High Fixed Costs: The Case of MRIs
Now consider the case of reimbursement for MRIs. Lowes (2013) explains:
For physicians performing diagnostic scans, one big expense is the cost of the
machine, such as a $2 million MRI scanner. In 2009, the Medicare Payment
Advisory Commission (MEDPAC) reported that the equipment needed for a
70553 MRI brain scan represented almost 90% of the TC fee.7
CMS calculates the per-service cost of imaging equipment by multiplying how
many minutes the machine is typically used for a particular scan by its cost per
minute. The cost per minute equals the purchase price of the machine spread
out over the number of minutes of likely use over its probable lifespan.
7To unpack the jargon, “70553” refers to the billing code associated with an MRI of the brain that does
not make use of contrast dye. “TC” refers to the technical component of the MRI, which is one of two
distinct components of the coding associated with bills for MRI services. The technical component involves
the actual administration of the MRI. The “professional component,” which is not mentioned above, refers
to the interpretation of the resulting imagine. The professional component is the labor-intensive component
of MRI provision. It accounts for roughly 10 percent of the total payment for a typical MRI service.
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In recent years, the payment for a typical MRI service has been on the order of $1,000.
The bulk of this payment is associated with “practice expenses,” which, as noted above, are
tracked separately from the payment associated with physicians’ “own work.” As noted by
Lowes (2013), the practice expense is associated primarily with the cost of the MRI machine
itself.
Medicare’s methodology can be described roughly as follows. The payment for an MRI
service is meant to equal average variable cost, AV C, plus average fixed cost, AFC. Average
variable costs are estimated, as in the case of office visits, on the basis of required quantities
of physician time, staff time, etc. How does Medicare estimate average fixed cost? Average
fixed cost is the total cost of the machine, F , divided by Medicare’s estimate of utilization
over the MRI machine’s lifetime, qest. Medicare’s reimbursement for an MRI service can
thus be written as
r = AV C +
F
qest
. (9)
With a reimbursement of $1,000 and average variable costs of roughly $200, Medicare’s
payment allows for an average fixed cost of $800. Given the $2 million cost of the MRI
machine, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) has assumed that the MRI
machine would be operational for around 2,500 services.
How did CMS arrive at this estimate and how accurate was it in practice? Lowes (2013)
writes that CMS based its initial calculation on the assumption that MRI machines would
be in use for approximately 25 hours per week. This turned out to be a significant un-
derstatement. More recent evidence, which the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission
(MEDPAC) has recommended adopting, suggests that actual usage is equivalent to 45 hours
per week. By underestimating utilization, CMS overstated the average fixed cost by 40
percent.
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Recall equation (3), which characterized physicians’ choices regarding the quantity of care
to provide. If variable costs were literally fixed at $200, then the net profit associated with
MRI provision would be a constant $800. Equation (3) implies that physicians would provide
MRIs until patients’ net benefits from the service are sufficiently negative to counteract
this financial incentive. This need not be taken literally to mean that the physician will
provide the service until it does harm. Negative net benefits may reflect low diagnostic
benefits coupled with the patient’s cost-sharing and inconvenience. As above, the cost of
the physicians’ own time, as well as the cost of managing the practice, would typically be
assumed to rise as the scale of the practice increases. As supply increases, these rising
marginal costs will moderately reduce the $800 in profit per service. It is nonetheless quite
clear that average cost reimbursement will tend to result in an excess of MRI provision
relative to office visits.
4.3 Payment Systems’ Influence on Entry and Investment
In the language of Ellis and McGuire’s payment model, Medicare Part B relies entirely
on r, the fee-for-service payment, and not at all on α, the salary-like payment. Indeed,
the salary-like payment disappeared relatively early in the exposition of the model itself;
optimal reimbursements have been described exclusively in terms of the per-unit reimburse-
ment. What is the role of the salary-like payment and how might it be used to improve the
reimbursement of capital-intensive services?
To this point, optimal payments have been described as payments that lead existing
physicians to provide care until its marginal cost equals its marginal benefit. Importantly,
health systems must also account for the development and entry of new physicians. By
itself, the per-unit payment provides an incomplete characterization of the total return to
practicing medicine. The total return, which determines the desirability of entering medical
practice in the first place, depends on both components of the payment. Adjustments to
13
the salary-like payment can worsen or improve the attractiveness of entering into medical
practice or making a variety of relevant investments. Margins of interest include the decision
to become a physician, the decision of an existing practice to treat Medicare beneficiaries,
and the decision to invest in imaging equipment like MRI machines.
Investment in MRI machines presents a classic case where mixing a salary-like payment
with a fee-for-service, or per-use, payment makes sense. When payments only involve the
per-unit reimbursement, Medicare faces a bind. Paying on the basis of average costs leaves
substantial incentives for over-utilization. Marginal cost reimbursement, on the other hand,
makes investment in imaging equipment unattractive. By financing a portion of the in-
vestment up front, Medicare can increase the attractiveness of investment without creating
incentives for excess utilization.
4.4 The Evolution of Physicians’ Practices and the Development
of New Technology
As discussed above, the decision to invest in advanced technology depends on the total
return to doing so. Under average cost reimbursement, this hinges in large part on the
accuracy of Medicare’s assessment of the machine’s lifetime usage. If Medicare significantly
understates lifetime usage, as Lowes (2013) reports it did, the incentive to invest will be
strong.
The history of physician investments suggests that the incentives created by Medicare
had substantial effects. Total utilization of advanced imaging equipment rose substantially
over recent decades. This was particularly true of utilization by physicians with self-referral
opportunities (Mitchell 2007, Mitchell 2008, Baker 2010). Hospitals were similarly observed
to respond to incentives favoring investments in capital equipment following Medicare Part
A’s adoption of the Prospective Payment System (Acemoglu and Finkelstein 2008).
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The incentives Medicare created, and the investments that ensued, have two additional
long-run implications. First, investment in advanced imaging technology alters the cost-
structure of physicians’ practices (Clemens and Gottlieb 2013). Such investments make
physicians’ practices more capital intensive, which widens the spread between marginal and
average costs. Over time, these investments have thus shifted physicians away from the types
of services for which Medicare’s fee schedule functions best. Adapting the fee schedule to
changes in the environment has thus become an increasingly urgent task.
Finally, physicians’ investments shape the markets for innovation in advanced imaging
equipment. When fee schedules encourage physicians to expand their provision of diagnostic
services, they create markets for advances in these technologies. A growing body of research
shows that the incentives created by factors including demographics, health policy, and in-
surance arrangements have substantial effects on innovative activity. Such evidence has been
found in the context of vaccine development (Finkelstein 2004), in the broader pharmaceu-
tical context (Acemoglu and Linn 2004), in the development of cancer treatments (Budish
et al. 2013), and in the development of medical equipment and devices (Clemens 2012). In
addition to shaping current care access and health expenditures, Medicare’s fee schedule
shapes the treatments and tools that will be at physicians’ disposal in future years.
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